two perspectives:
Inside and Outside
Inside view -
typically is: uniform single history, (like stairs or ladder)
seen as celebratory, "whiggish" presentism
Natural science perspective - "Old History" (i.e., Boring, 1929/1950)
Outside view -
typically is: critical and "situated"
in studies of history, sociology,
and philosophy (of science).
Human science perspective - "New History" (i.e., Danziger, 1990)
[see Figure
]
Power and politics in Science
the
current-kids & cell Phones
& Stephen Harper and Muzzling Scientists & Libraries
Zeitgeist: Social influence and "spirit of the times"
"Schools": Distinct schools or worldviews (Weltanschauungen)
Connectionist: Influence of events or inventions on others
Thematical: Seminal themes or issues of concern
Empiricism involving Induction and Observation,
Rationalism involving Deduction, Mathematics and certainty
Later, Kant called for empirical
science with
a rational foundation. Most
of 19th and 20th century
philosophers of science have
merely been
seeking "ways out of Kantianism" (Jones, 1975)
Two kinds of accounts: Descriptive and Prescriptive
ii) Logic: The study
of correct reasoning
-Examples: Deduction and Induction
iii) Metaphysics: The
careful study of concepts or first principles
such as: Substance, Quality,
Causal Relations
-Examples: (Ontology) Idealism
and Materialism
iv) Ethics: The theory
of (moral) evaluation.
Not traditionally a part of
science, although many
current philosophers of science
suggest that it cannot be avoided
Commentary...
Historical
development of Sciences:
Pre-paradigm, Normal Science,
Crisis, Revolution . . .
Disciplinary Matrix:
The set of fundamental (unstated)
assumptions underlying the
paradigm. Usually unconscious,
and not subject to empirical
testing
Shared Exemplars:
Models
of good research through which
students "learn to see" the
world through the paradigm's
perspective
Puzzle Solving: The actions of scientists during the "Normal
Science" phase, where there
are clearly defined "puzzles"
or problems to be solved
Conservatism:
The nature of scientists to overlook
anomalies as "bad observations" while maintaining, or
conserving the paradigm which
may no longer be functional
Anomalies: Observations
or "pieces of the puzzle" which cannot
be explained using the paradigm,
or "do not fit the puzzle"
Progress: Appears
during the Normal Science phase and is implied
when one paradigm takes over
from another, but is not guaranteed
Implicit Hermeneutics:
interpretation,
dialectic between "observer"
and "the world", value sensitive
and critical of paradigm choice
Bold conjectures and refutations ought to be the methods of science
Two contexts of scientific activity: Discovery and Justification
Three
Worlds
World
3: Products of the human mind.
Language and works of art
and science
World
2: World of subjective experiences.
Consciousness and Self-consciousness
World
1: World of physical objects.
Physical elements and living
beings
Causality goes both upwards and downwards
Imre Lakatos (1970): Sophisticated Falsificationism
Coexisting Research Programmes,
each with a hard core and
a protective belt
Hard Core: Positive
statements about basic necessary assumptions
Protective Belt: Auxiliary
hypotheses and inferences (predictions)
Rational choice between
programmes based upon
progressive and degenerative
problem shifts.
Margaret Benston (1989): Feminist Critique of Scientific Values!
Critical of the sex roles and
stereotypes, presumptions
of objectivity, and power
imbalances that are associated
with masculine science and
its "impoverishment of reality"
to "anti-human ends"
Winnie Thomm et al. (1989)Recovery from the trivialization of women's participation in science, use of qualitative methods (i.e., action research), hearing a women's "voice", personal grounding in perspectives (i.e., standpoint theory), hermeneutics & consciousness raising.
bell hooks - standpoint theory - it is important to acknowledge the places from which each of us "stand" and interpret the world, many forms of feminism and other perspectives.
Danziger, K. (1990). Constructing the subject: Historical origins of psychological research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Danziger, K. (1994). Does the history of psychology have a future? Theory & psychology, 4, 467-484.
Feyerabend, P. K. (1970). Consolations for the specialist. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Feyerabend, P. K. (1987). Farewell to reason. New York: Verso.
Feyerabend, P. K. (1988). Against method. New York: Verso.
Jones, W.T., (1975). A history of Western Philosophy (5 Vols.) New York: Harcourt, Brace Javanovich.
Kuhn, T.S. (1962/1970). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Leahey, T. H. (1994). A history of modern psychology. Englewood-cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Popper, K. R. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. New York: Basic.
Popper, K. R. (1970). Normal science and its dangers. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.