Inside view -
typically is: uniform single history, (like stairs or ladder)
seen as celebratory, "whiggish" presentism
Natural science perspective - "Old History" (i.e., Boring, 1929/1950)
Outside view -
typically is: critical and "situated"
in studies of history, sociology, and philosophy (of science).
Human science perspective - "New History" (i.e., Danziger, 1990)
Power and politics in Science
current-kids & cell Phones
& Stephen Harper and Muzzling Scientists & Libraries
Zeitgeist: Social influence and "spirit of the times"
"Schools": Distinct schools or worldviews (Weltanschauungen)
Connectionist: Influence of events or inventions on others
Thematical: Seminal themes or issues of concern
Empiricism involving Induction and Observation,
Rationalism involving Deduction, Mathematics and certainty
Later, Kant called for empirical
a rational foundation. Most of 19th and 20th century
philosophers of science have merely been
seeking "ways out of Kantianism" (Jones, 1975)
Two kinds of accounts: Descriptive and Prescriptive
ii) Logic: The study
of correct reasoning
-Examples: Deduction and Induction
iii) Metaphysics: The
careful study of concepts or first principles
such as: Substance, Quality, Causal Relations
-Examples: (Ontology) Idealism and Materialism
iv) Ethics: The theory
of (moral) evaluation.
Not traditionally a part of science, although many
current philosophers of science suggest that it cannot be avoided
development of Sciences:
Pre-paradigm, Normal Science, Crisis, Revolution . . .
The set of fundamental (unstated)
assumptions underlying the paradigm. Usually unconscious,
and not subject to empirical testing
of good research through which
students "learn to see" the world through the paradigm's
Puzzle Solving: The actions of scientists during the "Normal
Science" phase, where there are clearly defined "puzzles"
or problems to be solved
The nature of scientists to overlook
anomalies as "bad observations" while maintaining, or
conserving the paradigm which may no longer be functional
or "pieces of the puzzle" which cannot
be explained using the paradigm, or "do not fit the puzzle"
during the Normal Science phase and is implied
when one paradigm takes over from another, but is not guaranteed
dialectic between "observer"
and "the world", value sensitive and critical of paradigm choice
Bold conjectures and refutations ought to be the methods of science
Two contexts of scientific activity: Discovery and Justification
World 3: Products of the human mind.
Language and works of art and science
2: World of subjective experiences.
Consciousness and Self-consciousness
1: World of physical objects.
Physical elements and living beings
Causality goes both upwards and downwards
Imre Lakatos (1970): Sophisticated Falsificationism
Coexisting Research Programmes,
each with a hard core and a protective belt
Hard Core: Positive
statements about basic necessary assumptions
Protective Belt: Auxiliary hypotheses and inferences (predictions)
Rational choice between
programmes based upon
progressive and degenerative problem shifts.
Margaret Benston (1989): Feminist Critique of Scientific Values!
Critical of the sex roles and
of objectivity, and power imbalances that are associated
with masculine science and its "impoverishment of reality"
to "anti-human ends"
Winnie Thomm et al. (1989)Recovery from the trivialization of women's participation in science, use of qualitative methods (i.e., action research), hearing a women's "voice", personal grounding in perspectives (i.e., standpoint theory), hermeneutics & consciousness raising.
bell hooks - standpoint theory - it is important to acknowledge the places from which each of us "stand" and interpret the world, many forms of feminism and other perspectives.
Women against feminism?
Danziger, K. (1990). Constructing the subject: Historical origins of psychological research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Danziger, K. (1994). Does the history of psychology have a future? Theory & psychology, 4, 467-484.
Feyerabend, P. K. (1970). Consolations for the specialist. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Feyerabend, P. K. (1987). Farewell to reason. New York: Verso.
Feyerabend, P. K. (1988). Against method. New York: Verso.
Jones, W.T., (1975). A history of Western Philosophy (5 Vols.) New York: Harcourt, Brace Javanovich.
Kuhn, T.S. (1962/1970). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Leahey, T. H. (1994). A history of modern psychology. Englewood-cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Popper, K. R. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. New York: Basic.
Popper, K. R. (1970). Normal science and its dangers. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.